A BETTER PASTURE:
EXCELLENT SHEEP, AMOUR-PROPRE,
AND THE SEARCH FOR HAPPINESS
Nathan Thompson

“It is a hundred times easier to be happy than to
appear to be happy.”
-Jean Jacques Rousseau
“Of course I’m miserable, but were I not miserable,
I wouldn’t be at Yale.”
-William Deresiewicz

A double major, a sport, a musical instrument, a couple of
foreign languages, service work in distant corners of the globe,
and, of course, a few hobbies thrown in for good measure, each
mastered with effortlessness and a serene self-assurance. This is
the stuff of 21st-century super-achievers, those students at elite
schools who appear cheerfully competent at everything. If that
sounds anything like you, your friends, or what you aspire to
be, this paper is for you. If the names Deerfield, Williams,
Harvard, or Stanford mean anything to you, this paper is for
you. Most importantly, if you’re tired of running laps on the
well-worn treadmill of success, this paper is for you.
In his Excellent Sheep: The Miseducation of the American
Elite and the Way to a Meaningful Life, William Deresiewicz
unapologetically exposes the aspirations and deep-rooted
anxieties of the “best and brightest” filing into the top universities in the United States. He introduces the reader to the
formidable combination of brains, ambition, and fear of failure
residing in many young people and their families. These
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students’ capacity to consume, analyze, and regurgitate
information is breathtaking, be it every member of a class
memorizing and reciting 100 lines of Shakespeare without a
single error or a high school student conducting cancer research. Assign them a school task, and it will be completed
with ruthless efficiency. Every “i” will be dotted. Every “t” will
be crossed. Curiously, however, closer examination reveals so
many similarities between these high achievers that their
individual identities appear stripped away. One might even go
so far as to call them sheep. Of course, they are not average
sheep—they roam around together, eating AP courses for
breakfast, spending summers working prestigious internships,
and traveling the world for cultural enrichment. They are
excellent.
These kinds of students, however, are no longer simply the
product of the meritocracy for which America is famed. They
do not come from just anywhere, nor do they embody timehonored American examples of how hard work, long hours, and
a little bit of luck can take children of poverty and turn them
into something exceptional. Quite the opposite. In the clear,
compelling, and frightening three hundred pages of his Coming
Apart: The State of White America 1960-2010, Charles Murray
demonstrates that, for the first time, America is seeing both the
drawing and hardening of class lines: a real upper class, a real
lower class, and everyone in the middle moving in one direction or the other. 1 However, this divergence is not only a
monetary one. It is also one of values, habits, education, and
geographic location—and make no mistake: while a few
stragglers are welcomed into the fold, Deresiewicz’s sheep are
the children of this new upper class.
These excellent sheep, populating the Ivies (or their neighbors who rank highly in U.S. News and World Report) and
prestigious financial and consulting institutions after graduation, are the product of several important inputs: top-flight
1
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education, high family income, stability at home, parents with
advanced degrees, and geographic isolation from those not
sharing similar characteristics. Together, these factors have
begun limiting the capacity of traditional American meritocracy
to generate social and economic mobility. These students are
exceptionally competent, analytical, intelligent, and hardworking, but it would be dishonest to say that their smarts are
the sole cause of their material success in life. Success nowadays is primarily, if not exclusively, the result of a system. It is
a system caught somewhere between being hereditary and
meritocratic—generally speaking, circumstances of birth are
important but may not be enough to succeed anymore without
the brains to match and vice versa—and its products are
peerless. It is a system Deresiewicz describes as the laundering
of privilege. 2
Despite this system’s effectiveness, the excellence it produces comes at costs much greater than a few missed parties
and a handful of all-nighters. These costs are perhaps known
and felt in the deepest corners of the heart and mind but go
otherwise unarticulated: insecurity, fear of failure, a deeprooted unhappiness, and the atrophy of the soul. Recognizing
such costs might reasonably lead one to challenge and look for
alternatives to an excellent sheep’s notion of success, and
because these potential costs are too great to ignore, the
remainder of the paper will attempt to give them proper
attention.
In order to understand these creatures of success, it is first
necessary to explore the origin of their excellence. As
Deresiewicz and others observe, one does not have to look long
or far to see what creates this crop of high achievers. It begins
in the home, where a suffocating amount of pressure is applied
to achieve success from a young age. It does not even have to
be intentional. But as Deresiewicz writes, the business of
2
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“determining the exact hierarchy of status within the upper
middle class itself” is a serious one, and most, if not all, of a
family’s resources tend to be directed towards building the
pressure cooker that will spit out diamonds bearing Ivy League
credentials. 3
The lesson is learned from an early age that in life “there is
no middle ground; if you’re not the best, you’re a ‘loser.’ If
you’re not brilliant, you’re worthless.”4 Students may find
themselves identifying with the pressures that Deresiewicz
claims converge at home: “status competition within extended
families; peer pressure within communities; the desire to
measure up to your own parents, or to best them.” 5 The list of
achievements attained by kids trying to relieve those pressures
include the usual suspects of a perfect GPA, president of a club,
captain of a team, or first chair in the orchestra, but in the end,
each is simply a tool with which to measure outperforming
one’s peers.
As one might imagine, family relationships based on the
expectation of a child excelling above and beyond his or her
peers, even if unspoken, easily become conditional. Deresiewicz writes that what is “expected by many parents in
affluent communities is not a personal best but the absolute
best,” so even if all little Johnny can manage in his 10th grade
English class is a B+, that will not cut it at home. 6 Ultimately,
the “production of measurable virtue in children” is the goal
towards which Mom and Dad direct life. As Deresiewicz aptly
notes, though, measureable here means “capable of showing up
on a college application.” 7 Spending time “hanging out” or
hiking local trails on the weekend are not items that frequent
most resumes; learning a second language or tutoring underresourced kids are.
3
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Given the enormous expectations faced by students to be
the very best, it is no wonder that their identities are found in
“measurable” achievement. However, such identity is not only
given to Deresiewicz’s sheep. They also consume, perpetuate,
and preach it. The currency of this identity is Ivy League
acceptances, perfect SAT scores, and Instagram photos from
exotic trips. These are the symbols of status and accomplishment one can quietly slip into conversation with just enough of
an “aw, shucks” attitude to draw the verbal affirmation of one’s
peers while, one hopes, also making them jealous.
A deep, addictive satisfaction comes from such recognition. If one possesses enough of this currency, one becomes
entitled to his or her peers’ praise. And these excellent sheep
will do just about anything to strike it rich—or avoid coming up
empty. The purpose of life “becomes the accumulation of gold
stars,” and what constitutes a valid life becomes “affluence,
credentials, and prestige” rather than pursuing one’s passions.8
Professions that do not ultimately land six-figure salaries and
luxurious homes are not worth our time. Credentials that are not
instantaneously recognizable are without value. The pursuit of
meaning beyond a strong resume is nonsensical. Deresiewicz
imagines those deep-seated concerns with failure in the form of
a series of potent questions:
How can I become a teacher, or a minister, or a carpenter? Wouldn’t that be a waste of my fancy education?
What would my parents think? What would my friends
think? How would I face my classmates at our twentieth
reunion, when they’re all rich doctors or important people in New York? And the question that exists behind
them all: isn’t it beneath me? 9
These questions strike at the heart of the matter: everyone
is afraid of failing in front of parents and peers, showing any
sign of weakness, or having to show up at the reunion as a
8
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non-profit worker because neither McKinsey nor Bain nor
Goldman ever came calling. As a result, one must be able to do
everything and do everything well. The cost of falling short in
this respect becomes “not merely practical, but existential.”10
To not ultimately land at an Ivy League or one of its neighbors
on the way to a successful career in finance, consulting, law, or
medicine is the same as being worthless. And so we develop all
the necessary abilities for this kind of life—not how to think
but rather those “analytical and rhetorical skills that are
necessary for success in business and the professions.” 11
Ross Douthat memorably relates from his four years at
Harvard how he was taught to get away with doing as little as
possible. For him it was hard work to “get into Harvard,” to
compete for “offices and honors with thousands of brilliant and
driven young people,” and to fight for “law school slots and Ibanking jobs as college wound to a close.” 12 The academics,
though, were not hard work. They were “the easy part.” 13 As a
result, it was a rare sheep indeed that invested more time in true
learning than in making connections or crafting the perfect
resume. Deresiewicz is no kinder, suggesting that what “Ivy
League-caliber schools like Yale or Columbia teach their
students is how to pretend, and how to do it well.”14 Ultimately,
we build an identity around accomplishments that can pad a
resume, and we hope those resumes are strong enough to shore
up our self-esteem in the event of a calamitous development
such as criticism or failure.
Interestingly, the question why? is rarely asked—why it
matters so much that our SAT scores clear 1500 instead of
1400, why our BA must come from Princeton instead of
Rutgers, or why our first job has to be with J.P Morgan instead
10
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of a non-profit. Dwight Macdonald once remarked upon the
great curiosity that “we think it odd that a man should devote
his life to writing poems . . . but natural that he should devote it
to inducing children to breakfast on Crunchies instead of
Krispies.” 15 There is a depressing humor in Macdonald’s
observation, for who on the path to hard-earned success would
not recognize a well-paid marketing position with Kellogg as a
post more enviable than that of a high school English teacher?
Furthermore, there is a premise underlying this notion of
success that is similarly left in the shadows: that “what makes
for a happy life and a good society [is] simply self-evident, . . .
as if in either case the exclusive answer [is] more money.” 16 It
is a premise, though, that is accepted by a majority of students.
In 1971, only 37% of incoming college freshmen said it was
essential or very important to be “very well-off financially”
compared to 73% who said it was similarly important to
“develop a meaningful philosophy of life.” 17 In 2011, “the
numbers were almost reversed,” with 80% believing that being
very well off is essential versus only 47% emphasizing the
importance of developing a meaningful philosophy of life. 18
However, even those who achieve their goal of success, as
has already been noted, do not do so without cost. In fact, there
is a great deal of research and anecdotal evidence pointing to a
deep-seated unhappiness within the hearts and minds of the
high achievers among us. Deresiewicz writes that preteens and
teens from affluent and well-educated families experience
“among the highest rates of depression, substance abuse,
anxiety disorders, somatic complaints, and unhappiness of any
group of children” in the United States, with “as many as 22
percent of adolescent girls from financially comfortable
families” suffering from clinical depression. 19
15
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The disastrous effects of the pressure placed on teens in
upper-middle class homes is heartbreakingly documented by
Madeline Levine in her New York Times Bestseller, The Price
of Privilege. Her stories are similar and numerous, covering a
host of problems from drug abuse to binge drinking to anxiety
and depression to anorexia. Levine writes that “as many as 30
to 40 percent of twelve- to eighteen-year olds from affluent
homes are experiencing troubling psychological symptoms,”
which do nothing to lower the frequency of harmful behaviors
and the intensity of the pressure to succeed that is felt. 20 The
backdrop to each of her stories of young men and women
abusing drugs and alcohol, cutting, contemplating suicide, and
reporting remarkable unhappiness is almost universally a
combination of a crushing pressure to succeed, a crippling fear
of failure, and a misguided belief that pressing on might
somehow lead to happiness. These are the stories of excellent
sheep, and they are a wakeup call to those of us who either
tacitly or expressly endorse an environment of high-pressure
perfectionism.
When coupled with a deep unhappiness, this constant pursuit of “success” is exhausting. And yet, we continue to trap
ourselves in this vicious cycle. The pursuit of status, success,
and high achievement at the cost of sleep, relationships, true
learning, and even happiness becomes a race with no finish
line. So why do we keep running? Simply stated, we are slaves
to the opinions of others. Students are “trained to depend” upon
the “drug of praise.” 21 We become presidents of clubs, captains
of teams, and students with perfect GPAs and SAT scores not
because we genuinely enjoy them but because those are the
things that ensure we will receive the most praise. These
symbols of achievement “signify not just your fate, but your
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identity; not just your identity, but your value. They are who
you are, and what you’re worth.” 22
Self-worth becomes comparative in nature. If we don’t
score as well as other students on standardized tests, attend the
same elite schools as our peers, or land the same prestigious
jobs after graduation, we must suffer the low opinion of our
parents, our friends, and our professors—an unacceptable
prospect. The problem with self-worth based on a relative
sentiment like opinion is that it engenders a severe internal
uncertainty and instability. Under such circumstances, there can
be little confidence of place or of one’s own value as an
individual. In turn, such uncertainty demands the herculean
efforts exhibited by those excellent sheep climbing ever higher
on the ladder of success.
Unfortunately for those sheep, though, there is no rooftop
to reach, so the climbing never ends. When chasing after status
and the high regard of others, one finds very quickly that
“status doesn’t get you much except the knowledge that you
have it.” Given its endless nature, this pursuit “doesn’t just not
make you happy: it makes you actively unhappy” precisely
because it is “comparative, and competitive, by its very nature.”
Deresiewicz shares the sorry experience of those students who
get to places like Yale thinking they’ve arrived, “only to
discover that there are still other places to arrive at” and that
there always will be. Clearly, contentment and the pursuit of
status do not mix. 23
It should come as no surprise that a life spent running a
race that has no finish line would be both exhausting and
deeply unsatisfying, yet it would appear that many of us remain
committed to the enterprise of chasing down success. This
commitment is inextricably linked to a conception of self-love
that is comparative. Our worth is bolstered when we compare
ourselves to others and find that we are achieving just as much
as or more than our peers, that we have at least the same or,
22
23
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better yet, higher GPAs than our fellow students, or that we got
the internship commensurate to our elite education.
This is a picture that many of us might recognize within
ourselves. It is this kind of self love—a relative, comparative,
and dangerous sentiment—that deserves further exploration, for
to comprehend our unwavering commitments to success and
status first requires an understanding of our own yardstick of
self-worth. The comparative nature of our self-love is not
unique to 21st-century high-achievers; it has long been the
companion of humankind. Because this is the case, wisdom
would demand that we examine what those who came before us
have thought and written about our tendency to compare.
When one explores the works of the world’s great thinkers,
it does not take long to realize that many have identified and
analyzed this very issue. Of all those who have written about it,
though, there is one that stands out. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, an
18th-century political philosopher, presents an articulation and
analysis of amour-propre, or vanity—our tendency to value
ourselves based on how we compare to those around us—that is
unrivaled in its clarity, frankness, and forcefulness of argument.
To read Rousseau is to view the human soul with an X-ray.
He exposes, as only he can, the many masks of benevolence,
humility, and selflessness we wear to cover the ambition, ill
will towards others, and selfishness we harbor. However, what
makes Rousseau’s analysis of the problem of comparative selflove the best of its kind (and so helpful for our excellent sheep)
is that he traces its development from cradle to full-fledged
adulthood. According to Rousseau, we are not born as hateful,
vain, or callous individuals but rather as people who learn to be
just so. To more fully understand the quandary of Deresiewicz’s excellent sheep, joining Rousseau at man’s beginning
is a helpful place to start, before tracing the progression to the
final product—namely, an individual who bases his or her value
on the opinions and judgments of others.
For Rousseau, natural man begins as a blank slate, removed from any and all “artificial faculties he could only have
acquired by prolonged progress,” such as language, tools,

102

Nathan Thompson

buildings, or farming. 24 In this state, Rousseau finds a man
“sating his hunger beneath an oak, slaking his thirst at the first
stream, finding his bed at the foot of the same tree that supplied
his meal, and with that his needs are satisfied.” 25 This is a
person in simplest form, needing nothing more than food,
water, and shelter. When deprived of every sort of enlightenment, the only goods known to natural man are “food, a female,
and rest,” and natural man does not even possess the
“knowledge of death and its terrors.”26 In fact, so blind is
natural man to anything past the present that “his projects, as
limited as his views, hardly extend to the close of day.” 27
Part of the utter simplicity of natural man is tied to a desire
for self-preservation. Rousseau writes that man’s “first care”
was “that for his preservation,” a driving force that leads a
person to seek only the most basic needs.28 This kind of desire
is described by Rousseau as “self-love—a primitive, innate
passion, which is anterior to every other.” 29 It is not hateful or
desiring of the approval of others. To Rousseau, “self-love,
which regards only ourselves, is contented when our true needs
are satisfied.” 30
However, the trouble begins when we leave a solitary life
and interact with other human beings. By virtue of seeing
another person, one observes the differences that exist between
one’s self and the other. In fact, Rousseau argues that the very
act of thinking—something unique to the human race—requires
24 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “Discourse on the Origin and Foun-
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that we make distinctions and identify what makes each object
and person unique. For instance, Rousseau challenges his
reader to try and outline the image of a tree without specifics
but goes on to argue that such a task is impossible. He writes
that “in spite of yourself, [the tree] will have to be seen as small
or large, bare or leafy, light or dark . . . you cannot help making
its lines perceptible or its surface colored.” 31 It is impossible to
see things generally—we view the world in specifics. Ultimately, thinking amounts to distinguishing between various objects
and ideas, so when one person comes in contact with another,
specific comparison is inevitable.
As Rousseau states, “The first glance [man] casts on his
fellows leads him to compare himself with them.” 32 Even if no
malevolence is intended, we gauge who is taller, who is faster,
or who is stronger. Rousseau notes that “the relations which we
express by the words great, small, strong, weak, fast, slow,
fearful, bold, and other such ideas, compared as need required
and almost without thinking about it, finally produced in him
some sort of reflection, or rather a mechanical prudence that
suggested to him the precautions most necessary for his
safety.” 33
It is not long, though, before elementary comparisons develop into a habit of comparing more than height, speed, or
strength. Rousseau notes that while man was “scarcely able to
discriminate ranks, . . . he was from afar preparing to claim first
rank as an individual.” 34 From this first point of comparison,
the long fall from innocence begins. Rousseau’s description is
worth quoting at length:
Everyone began to look at everyone else and to wish to
be looked at himself, and public esteem acquired a price.
The one who sang or danced best; the handsomest, the
31
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strongest, the most skillful, or the most eloquent came to
be the most highly regarded, and this was the first step
at once toward inequality and vice: from these first preferences arose vanity and contempt on the one hand,
shame and envy on the other; and the fermentation
caused by these new leavens eventually produced compounds fatal to happiness and innocence.35
Thus is born amour-propre, or vanity. It is “a relative sentiment, factitious, and born in society, which inclines every
individual to set greater store by himself than by anyone
else.” 36 Not only that, it also “demands others to prefer us to
themselves, which is impossible.”37 For Rousseau, it is inescapable. It is not just that we became vain and envious, though.
Amour-propre, a sentiment of vanity and comparison, has a
distinct character, one of “consuming ambition” that “instills in
all men a black inclination to harm one another, a secret
jealousy that is all the more dangerous as it often assumes the
mask of benevolence in order to strike its blow in greater
safety.” 38
Rousseau’s analysis clearly identifies what the mental processes behind amour-propre actually are. After all, how often
do we wear masks of benevolence in order to ensure that we are
ultimately viewed as better than our peers? How often do we
feign humility or generosity or kindness simply for the sake of
being thought of as humble, generous, or kind? How many
times have we cared far more about how others viewed us than
about the morality or character of our actions? Not as immediately clear, though, are the consequences of this kind of selflove, and this is where Rousseau’s articulation of the deepest
impact of amour-propre is so compelling.
35

Ibid., 166.
Ibid., 218.
37 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile or On Education, trans. Alan
Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979), 214.
38
Rousseau, “Second Discourse,” 171.
36

105

Furman Humanities Review
The nature of amour-propre is such that it takes an individual content with a simple life and teaches him or her to
depend upon the opinion of others for value and meaning. The
effect is one of deep unhappiness because a self-love based
upon comparisons made with others is never assured of stability
or fulfillment. In other words, we can always find something
with which to compare ourselves and in which to find ourselves
lacking.
Rousseau relates the story of a young man, who, seeing
another young man “better dressed than himself,” secretly
complains “about his parents’ avarice.”39 However, if this same
young man finds himself “more adorned than another,” he is
“pained to see this other outshine him by birth or wit, and to see
all his gilding humiliated in the presence of a simple cloth
suit.” 40 If nothing else, Rousseau teaches us that there are
innumerable ways to find one’s self inferior to others and that
this leads to a profound unhappiness. Much like the young
people Deresiewicz and Levine describe as suffering from
tremendous pressure to succeed (and the resulting assortment of
consequences), Rousseau’s young man is an example of the
deep insecurity and unhappiness resulting from dependence on
a feeling of relative success among one’s peers.
Of course, there is an assumption necessarily made preceding an individual’s dependence on his or her standing in the
eyes of others, which is that status, praise, and money are
actually valuable in and of themselves. Rousseau writes that “in
order to see the purpose of so many cares . . . power and
reputation would have to have some sort of meaning in [a
man’s] mind.” There is a critical lesson learned, namely that
“there is a sort of men who count how they are looked upon by
the rest of the universe for something, who can be happy and
satisfied with themselves on the testimony of others rather than
on their own.” 41
39
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There is much of ourselves to be recognized in these 18thcentury writings—a frantic habit of comparison, of looking in
the mirror to ensure everything appears just right, of assigning
great weight to unquantifiable concepts of status or reputation—and Rousseau forcefully accounts for how we arrive at
such a position. From that first glance at another human being
right up to the birth of that dark inclination to see harm done to
those around us, the path is well worn. But if in fact the
tendency to compare to others to the point of exhaustion and
unhappiness is not just a tendency but also an intractable
plague, is there anything to be done?
Reading Rousseau’s assessment of our character is both a
powerful and—if one takes his claims about human nature
seriously—disconcerting experience. His analysis unceremoniously strips away our masks of benevolence and sincerity,
revealing the jealousy, unsympathizing ambition, and paralyzing fear that we seek to hide. But does it do us any good only to
know that day in and day out, we ask others to value us above
themselves? That the recognition and status we inevitably
pursue only makes us vain and insecure people? That the
moment we meet others, we begin making comparisons that can
only end in enmity? While recognizing a problem can be a
helpful step, to end on such a note given the reality of amourpropre does little to address Rousseau’s predicament or offer
solace to Deresiewicz’s sheep. Thus, an exploration of
Rousseau’s conception of a life without amour-propre—a life
of true happiness—becomes necessary.
Rousseau claims that “it is a hundred times easier to be
happy than to appear to be happy,” and this serves as an
outstanding introduction to his notion of happiness.42 This
thought demands that we ask ourselves a question, and it is one
that Deresiewicz is quick to point out that many high achieving
college students either do not know or are too afraid to ask.
This question, surprising as it may be, is not “what will make
me the most successful in life?” or “what will earn me the most
42
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money in life?” Instead the question is “what makes me
happy?” As much of a cliché as it is, this remains an important
question for a society that so readily surrenders its happiness
and self-worth to the opinions of other people. Rousseau’s
insight calls for reflection on what we are doing to appear
happy to others and what we might change so that we are
actually happy.
Rousseau’s answer to this question, perhaps not surprisingly, has little to do with obtaining an Ivy League degree,
working for a prestigious consulting firm, or owning a nice
house. In fact, it begins with simplicity, a virtue with which
many at the top of the food chain may be unfamiliar. This
becomes clear in a number of his writings, particularly his
“Second Discourse,” “Book IV” of Emile, and his Reveries of
the Solitary Walker. Rousseau describes the experience of a
wealthy man who owns a palace but finds no use for all the
rooms because he cannot occupy each one. In the end, it
becomes a gilded cage, promising luxury but delivering an
experience of imprisonment.43 The great flaw of amourpropre’s relative nature is that it spurs the accumulation of
excess (money, clothes, land, titles, reputation), which only
gives people more and more ways to compare what they do or
do not possess. As Rousseau writes, “Sociable man, always
outside himself, is capable of living only in the opinion of
others and, so to speak, derives the sentiment of his own
existence solely from their judgment.” 44 To Rousseau, the first
and proper response to the comparative tendencies of amourpropre is to make an effort to return to simplicity.
An example of what this kind of simplicity looks like for
Rousseau is captured in his Fifth Walk of the Solitary Walker,
during which he describes his days spent on a nearly deserted
island in the middle of a Swiss lake. This sort of abandonment
of society may strike the modern observer as decidedly odd.
After all, Rousseau does not have an iPhone or laptop on his
43
44
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person, so there will be no way to share with others what he
sees; he has only his memory to capture everything around him.
The scene before Rousseau is one where “there is more natural
greenery, more meadows, grove-shaded retreats, more frequent
contrasts, and more variety in the terrain” than on the mainland. 45 Life on the island forbids “any kind of communication
with the mainland so that being unaware of all that went on in
the world I might forget its existence and that it might also
forget mine.” 46 On Rousseau’s island, no filtered (or #nofilter)
Instagram posts reach the rest of society. No Facebook statuses
describing the “incredible” or “awesome” or “breathtaking”
sights of this island reach the newsfeeds of others, and none of
their communications reach Rousseau. Pleasure is taken from
nothing other than a short walk. Hours are spent observing the
beauty of a single flower. Reward is drawn from an afternoon
paddling around the lake.
Another aspect of this simplicity is its decided lack of orientation towards a set of tasks or goals. Rousseau’s days are
spent “without having any well-determined or constant object,”
a concept that also might fail to compute for a 21st-century
achiever. 47 Somehow, though, this kind of simplicity is what
brings Rousseau the most happiness, and he calls these aimless
days “a hundred times preferable to the sweetest things I had
found in what are called the pleasures of life.” 48
Simplicity is only the beginning of happiness for
Rousseau, though, because the value of a simple life rests on
the bedrock of a more important idea, that true contentment is
found in the sentiment of one’s existence—that the fact of
being alive is enough for one to always be satisfied with life.
One may argue that it is impossible to live a contented and
45
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fulfilled life by merely appreciating one’s existence, but
Rousseau makes a compelling case that demands a serious
response.
In his Reveries of the Solitary Walker, Rousseau describes
the experience of awakening to how unnecessarily he was
weighed down by the opinions of others. He first believed
others viewed him as “the horror of the human race,” observing
that “the only greeting passersby would give [him] would be to
spit” on him. 49 This caused great agitation, indignation, and a
tendency to struggle “without cleverness, without craft . . .
without prudence.” 50 However, after realizing that such innerconflict only ever resulted in an endless struggle over what
cannot be controlled (the opinions of others), he took the only
remaining course, namely “submitting to [his] fate without
railing against necessity any longer.” 51 Rousseau recognized
how much stock he set by the expectations and opinions of
others and, understanding he could not control either one,
finally decided to refrain from assigning them value. No longer
chained to what others think or say about him, Rousseau is able
to find ultimate meaning and value in his own life.
For Rousseau, the sentiment of existence possesses beauty
and mystery. In his Fifth Walk, he says it is a sentiment
“stripped of any other emotion, is in itself a precious sentiment
of contentment and of peace which alone would suffice to make
this existence dear and sweet to anyone able to spurn all the
sensual and earthly impressions which incessantly come to
distract us from it and to trouble its sweetness here-below.” 52
The appeal of the argument for a happiness not derived from
earthly pleasures and the comparisons it leads us to make is that
it is dependent on no person other than one’s self. It is not by
God’s help that we become truly content. It is not by the help of
our neighbor. Rather, we become “like God,” Rousseau claims,
49
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when we are content in our own environment and with our own
existence; by remaining in this state, “we are sufficient unto
ourselves.” 53
One can contest Rousseau’s claim of the ultimate source of
this contentment, but his articulation of the truest expression of
happiness is compelling for two reasons. First, it speaks to a
longing for freedom from the social upkeep to which many feel
chained, and second, there is a profound appeal found in a life
committed to simplicity. In the end, Rousseau’s solution for a
vain and comparing people is to attack the problem of amourpropre at its source: the more simply we live, the fewer points
of reference we have with which to compare. Stated most
succinctly, Rousseau’s conception of happiness is a simple life
drawn from the deeper well of our own self-sufficiency and
contentment with existence.
One may observe that no excellent sheep is an island, but
even still, a serious reading of Rousseau’s assessment of
amour-propre and his solution to the problem demands sober
reflection on our habit of comparison to others and what might
be done about it. To Rousseau, amour-propre is deeply
entrenched. Worse still for us, we are unable to retreat from
society in quite the same way Rousseau does in his Reveries.
Nevertheless, we can still ask the questions of ourselves that his
analysis raises—what do we do because we enjoy the praise it
earns us? What do we do for fear of not measuring up if we do
not? What do we refuse to do for fear of failure? How often do
we find ourselves quite literally looking at another person and
considering the ways in which we think he or she is better or
worse than us?
These are questions that, if asked seriously, should illuminate the places where we are most enslaved to the opinions of
others; as such, asking these questions can be a risk, for to
examine the parts of ourselves that are dependent on others is to
acknowledge vulnerabilities we may wish to remain unexposed.
Despite this risk, though, a willingness to search for substantive
53
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answers to the questions of why we burn the midnight oil, join
ten clubs, and cast every part of life in terms of success or
failure is, in my estimation, the first step towards freedom from
the opinion of others.
Deresiewicz and Rousseau both articulate the pervasive
problem of a life spent worrying about what others think of
you. For them, such a life is an exercise in exhaustion and
unhappiness. It is a treadmill of accomplishments, empty
accolades, stress, and, most importantly, constant comparison,
and it leaves those stuck running on it with no purpose other
than to keep from falling off. Rousseau offers a solution to this
problem, and it is one of radical contentment with the simple
fact of one’s own existence. One may find such an existence to
be deeply unsatisfying or impractical. However, by proposing
such a remedy, Rousseau moves the conversation forward, and
in doing so, he raises the question that any excellent sheep
should be keen to address: if a life spent on the treadmill of
success leads to unhappiness, how do we step off?
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